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A REVIEW OF SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISES
CREDIT DELIVERY STRATEGIES IN NIGERIA*
CHIEF E.E. INANG**

and
DR. G.E. UKPONG

The paper reviews the crucial role of Small-Scale Enterprises [SSEs] in facilitating
industrial development, some special advantages of existing credit schemes to
small-scale enterprises, the peculiar handicaps which SSEs face, the most crucial being
poor access to development finance, and highlights areas and ways in which credit
guarantee and insurance schemes for SSEs could substantially contribute to their
development and growth in Nigeria. Notable among the credit schemes and
institutions reviewed are the Small-Scale Industries Credit Scheme (SSICS)
introduced in 1971; the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBC!) established
in 1978; the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank (NIDB); the Central Bank of
Nigeria's credit guidelines for SSEs under the Bank's Monetary Policy Guidelines;
and the Central Bank's Rural Banking Programme, effective from 1979. Other
relatively new schemes and institutions also covered include the National Economic
Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND); the World Bank-sponsored Small and
Medium-Scale Enterprises Loan Scheme (SMEX); the Nigerian Export and Import
Bank (NEXIM); the People's Bank of Nigeria (PBN) and the Community Banks. ·
Available evidence shows that, in spite of the existence of many special credit
schemes and the crucial role that SSEs are expected to play in grass-root development,
these enterprises are yet to enjay reasonable access to credit as they still depend largely
on personal/family and informal sources of funds. Shortage of loanable funds seems
to be the main handicap of the formal, specialized, public sector credit institutions like
NBC!, the state-owned investment corporations and the People's Bank of Nigeria. On
the other hand, the fundamental problems which constrains SSEs' access to credit are
the low level of credit from formal sources such as banks and the credit schemes
managed under them, the low credit rating of SSEs as a result of their high risk nature,
high mortality rate as well as poor management. The relationship between SSEs and
the banks has, indeed, never been cordial because of the low priority the banks accords
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small-scale enterprises in their operations. The new schemes such as NERFUND,
SMEX and the NEXIM are more result-oriented because of their operational
strategies. However,- they too are constrained by the terms under which they acquire
their funds, mainly from multi-lateral financial institutions and the conditions under
which such funds are to be disbursed. Other related problems which have also hindered
SSEs' access to credit include their low productivity and weak capital base, which
impede their ability to compete effectively with other categories of enterprises in the
domestic financial markets. Most of the SSEs lack even the rudimentary skills
necessary for preparing bankable proposals for consideration by lending institutions.
Against this background, the growth prospects of the SSEs appear very bleak,
especially under the pr~sent economic environment of liberalization and deregulation.
This situation has given rise to the view among financial analysts that, for the SSEs
to achieve improved access to credit for discharging their vital role as facilitators of
industrial development, it would be necessary to evolve a more pragmatic lending
strategy that will specifically address the basic problem of the inability of SSEs to raise
much needed collateral securities to back their demand for credit from formal sources.
Such a strategy would help to reconcile the peculiar limitations of the SSEs regarding
collateral securities with the commercial motives o1 privat~ lending institutions which
presuppose that they should cover their cost of operation and also safeguard their
funds. One option that has gained popularity is the credit guarantee/insurance scheme
for small-scale enterprises similar to that currently in use fo1· lending to agricultural
enterprises.
The paper also reviews the basic principles of credit guarantee/insurance schemes
and evaluates, for possible lessons, the operations of these schemes as credit-facilitating
mechanisms in three selected developing countries where they have been tried, namely,
India, Mexico and the Philippines. The review of the experiences of these countries is
followed by an examination of the agricultural credit guarantee and insurance scheme
in Nigeria with a view to further identify ways in which credit guarantee and
insurance schemes could generally support and promote the growth of Nigerian
small-scale enterprises. On balance, the countries' experiences indicate that credit
guarantee/insurance schemes, which guarantee/ insure credit risk of the SSEs in place
of collateral security which they cannot afford, have in fact facilitated the flow of credit
from private credit institutions to the target sectors/enterprises in the three countries
selected as well as in the agricultural sector in the case of Nigeria. On the basis of this
evidence, the paper advocates the introduction of such schemes for Nigerian small-scale
enterprises (excluding trading enterprises) along the line of the Agricultural Credit
Guarantee/Insurance Schemes. Indeed, it was observed that as far back as 1976, the
Committee on the Review of the Nigerian Financial System had suggested such a
scheme for Nigeria. The NERFUND Scheme, in cooperation with the National
Insurance Company of Nigeria (NICON), is already spear-heading the introduction
of the scheme for its lending. Under the existing economic environment, however, the
subsidy which normally goes with such schemes should not persist indefinitely, as in
the case with the agricultural credit guarantee scheme. Enterprises for which credit is
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being guaranteed/insured should ultimately be able to pay some premium on such
scheme. In this regard, the credit insurance scheme has some edge over the orthodox
credit guarantee scheme partly because the premium can readily be computed and
subsidized (if necessary) and partly because the scheme also insures the projected
inromes from the project for which credit is provided.

INTRODUCTION
In recent years, particularly since the adoption of the economic reform programme
in Nigeria in 1986, there has been a decisive switch of emphasis from the grandiose,
capital intensive, large-scale industrial projects based on the philosophy of import
substitution to small-scale industries with immense potentials for developing domestic linkages for rapid, sustainable industrial development. Apart from their potential
for ensuring a self-reliant industrialization, in terms of ability to rely largely on local
raw materials, small-scale enterprises are also in a better position to boost employment, guarantee a more even distribution of industrial development in the country,
including the rural areas, and facilitate the growth of non-oil exports.
Consequently, both the Federal and State governments and, recently, local
governments, have stepped up efforts to promote the development of small-scale
enterprises through increased incentive schemes, including enhanced budgetary
allocations for technical assistance programmes. New lending schemes and credit
institutions such as the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND), World
Bank-assisted Small-Scale Enterprises Loan Scheme (SMEX), Nigerian Export and
Import Bank (NEXIM), the People's Bank of Nigeria (PBN) and the Community Bank
have also emerged at both the national and local levels to boost the flow of
development finance to SSEs which have so far depended largely on personal funds
and credit from informal sources for both their investments and working capital.
Unfortunately, all these formal credit schemes have not been able to adequately
redress the fundamental problems which have constrained SSEs' access to credit. The
low credit rating of this class of enterprises is attributable largely to their weak capital
base, high mortality rate, low productivity and shortage of managerial skills. Indeed,
the problems of weak capital base and poor access to finance appear to have
developed into some vicious circle, leading to slow growth, stagnation, and even
rapid demise of the SSEs. The impact of all existing credit schemes, in terms of
providing funds for meaningful and sustained development among the SSEs, had
hardly been noticeable. Thus, for the SSEs to serve the expected role of catalyst for
rapid industrial development, there is need for a more innovative strategy for
improved access to development finance for the SSEs that would address their
inability to provide collateral securities for loans from formal credit institutions.
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The objective of this paper is to review the crucial role of SMEs in facilitating
industrial development in Nigeria; some advantages of existing credit schemes to
SMEs; the peculiar problems which SSEs face, the most crucial being access to finance,
and to highlight areas and ways in which credit guarantee and insurance schemes
for SSEs could increasingly contribute to their growth and development.
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. The first section highlights the
main strengths of the SSEs which make this class of enterprises indispensable to
meaningful industrial development, especially in developing countries, as well as
weaknesses which render them vulnerable. The second section reviews the various
sources of funding the SSEs, including the special credit programmes and schemes
introduced over the years to improve SSEs' access to development finance in Nigeria.
The formal sources include public sector credit institutions like State Investment
Trust, the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI), and the People's Bank
of Nigeria as well as private credit institutions and schemes such as commercial and
merchant banks, and recently NERFUND, SMEX, NEXIM, and Community Banks.
Section three assesses the impact of these formal credit institutions and schemes/
programmes in terms of their ability to boost SSEs' access to credit. It also highlights
the major factors that have militated against their effectiveness. Section four examines
further options for improving the flow of formal credit to SSEs, drawing mainly from
the lessons of three selected developing countries which introduced credit
guarantee/ insurance schemes to facilitate SSEs' access to credit. The countries are
India, Mexico and the Philippines. Finally, section five provides a summary of the
main findings and conclusions of the paper.

PART I
NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NIGERIAN
SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISES

Definition of Small-Scale Enterprises (SSEs)
There is hardly any unique, universally accepted definition of SSEs because the
classification of business into small or large-scale is a subjective and qualitative
judgement (Ekpenyong, D.B.E. and M.O. Nyong, 1992). Rather, each country tends
to define this category of enterprises based usually on the peculiar needs of public
policies. Even within a country, the definition changes over time, depending on
circumstances and specific objectives of institutions. There are, however, some common indicators in most definitions, namely, the size of capital investment (fixed
assets), value of annual turnover (gross output) and number of paid employees. The
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popularity of the three indicators derives largely from their ease of measurement.
In countries such as the United States of America, Britain and Canada, small-scale
business is defined in terms of annual tum-over and the number of paid employees.
In Britain, for instance, a small-scale business is defined as "that industry with an
annual turn-over of £2 million or less with fewer than 200 paid employees. In Japan,
a small-scale industry is defined according to the type of industry. For instance, smallmedium-scale enterprises in manufacturing are defined as those with ¥100 million
as paid up capital and 300 employees; while those in wholesale trade should have
¥30 million paid-up capital and 100 employees.
In Nigeria, the definition of SSEs also varies from time to time and according to
institutions. For instance, the Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) Monetary Policy
Circular No. 22of 1988 defined small-scale enterprises (excluding general commerce)
as enterprises in which total investment (including land and working capital) did not
exceed HS00,000 and or the annual tum-over did not exceed HS.0 million. Following
the persistent depreciation in the exchange rate of the naira, the maximum size of
capital investment has been raised to HS.0 million and the turn-over to H25.0 million
since 1990. In the 1990 budget, the Federal Government of Nigeria defined small-scale
enterprises, for purpose of commercial bank loans, as those enterprises with annual
turnover not exceeding HS00,000 and for merchant bank loans, those enterprises with
capital investments not exceeding H2 million (excluding cost of land) or a maximum
of HS million. The National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND) puts the
ceiling for small-scale industries at HlO million. Section 37b (2) of the Companies and
Allied Matters Decree of 1990 defines a "small company" as one with:
(a)

Annual turnover of not more than H2 million;

(b)

Net assets value of not more than HI million.

For the purpose of this study, a small-scale enterprise is defined as an enterprise
whose total cost, excluding cost of land but including working capital, is above NI
million but not exceeding HlO million. This is the new national definition as
contained in the CBN Monetary and Credit Policy Guidelines for 1993 fiscal year.

The Role of Small-Scale Enterprises
In the light of recent economic realities, government now accords a very high priority
to the development of small and medium scale enterprises, especially industrial
enterprises. The importance is based mainly on the belief that such enterprises are
likely to facilitate the development of a broader base, indigenous entrepreneurial
culture for the country and a higher value-added to domestic industrial production.
In addition, the promotion of small-scale induf:tries is seen as a major tool for boosting
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employment as they employ a larger number of people per unit of investment capital
than the large-scale, capital-intensive enterprises. Other objectives for promoting
small-scale industries include the following:
(i)

enhancement of regional economic balance through industrial dispersal,
including rural areas;

(ii)

moderation of rural-urban migration;

(iii) promotion of effective domestic resource utilization;

(iv) facilitation of managerial training for unskilled and semi-skilled labour; and
(v)

production of intermediate goods for use in large enterprises.

Advantages of SSEs
Economists [e.g. Cukor, G., 1974] have, in addition to the above roles expected of the
SSEs, also identified specific advantages associated with small-scale enterprises.
These include the following:
(i)

SSEs are relatively less capital-intensive and therefore ideal as a channel of
industrial development for capital deficient, developing economies;

(ii)

they are relatively more flexible and can react quickly and easily to changes
and special requirements and are therefore better suited for launching new
products, where scale of operation can be made very small at the outset and
allowed to expand in case of success, thereby keeping risks under greater
control than larger enterprises;

(iii) besides, the sizes of these enterprises enable great flexibility in their manage-

ment and are therefore viable testing grounds for new techniques of production;
(iv) SSEs can easily adapt to the local market and local sources of raw materials
and may thus achieve savings in transport costs, and are therefore more
suited for promoting industrial dispersal/ decentralization of industry in
rural areas;
(v)

they are suitable for mobilizing small savings for productive purposes, which
would not be readily forthcoming or at least not in industrial capital formation within the context of large-scale projects; and

(vi) SSEs are more efficient than the large-scale plants in utilizing and training a
small number of skilled labour which it can more readily and effectively
utilize.
It is thus clear that small-scale enterprises as a group have a very crucial role to play
in the process of economic development, especially in capital-scarce economies like
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Nigeria. The search for basic ingredients for attaining the above lofty objectives has
been the concern of government over the years.

Major Disadvantages of SSEs
While the importance of small-scale enterprises to a nation's development has been
well recognized, these enterprises are equally beset with a number of structural
problems which have constrained their ability to play the pivotal role expected of
them. Although most people often regard inadequate finance as the major single
problem which has inhibited the development of small-scale industries, there are
indeed other equally critical problems of which the poor access to credit is a mere
manifestation. Some of these problems are summarized below:
(i) Under-Capitalization

The major source of financing small-scale enterprises the world over is the owner's
capital. In Nigeria, as in many other developing countries, this problem is accentuated by the unwillingness of sole proprietors to allow the participation of outsiders
in what is usually considered personal/family ventures.
(ii) Small-Size of SSES

There is also the problem of small-size itself which often gives neither encouragement
to nor attracts the attention of outside interest.
(iii) Dearth of Tangible Assets

Another factor which hinders the flow of financial assistance to small-scale
enterprises is the fact that individual SSEs and their owner/ owners usually lack
adequate tangible assets which could serve as collateral to secure loans from private
credit institutions.
(iv) High Mortality Rate

Available evidence also shows that a large number of all newly registered small-scale
enterprises usually fold up du ring their first year of registration, while an even larger
number hardly survive the first few years of operation. Th us, a part from the problems
of under-capitalization, the high rate of business failure among the SSEs has been
ascribed to such factors as poor knowledge of project conceptualization and implementation, given the dearth of managerial and technical skills among most SSEs.
(v) lilgh Risk Rating

As a direct consequence of some of the above-mentioned problems, nearly all smallscale enterprises are usually classified as "high-risk" ventures by most lending
institutions. Consequently, they are usually accorded very low priority rating in
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credit institutions' lending schemes. This problem is also often associated with high
degree of loan diversion to unscheduled activities and high rate of default in loan
repayment.
(vi) Low Productivity Among the SSES

Final!v, as a result of poor financial base and smallness of their market share, the
prod~ctivity of these enterprises is generally very low. They are therefore hardly able
to compete effectively in both factor and product markets.

PART II
REVIEW OF THE MAIN SOURCES OF FINANCING SSEs
Sources of Finance
There are four main sources of enterprise financing open to SSFs in Nigeria. These
are as follows:
(i)

formal financial institutions such as commercial banks, merchant banks,
savings banks, insurance companies, and the development banks;

(ii)

informal financial institutions consisting of money lenders, landlords, credit
and savings associations, esusu, friends, and relations;

(iii) personal savings; and

(iv) other financing schemes -SME Apex Loan Scheme, NERFUND, NEXIM,
etc.
The majority of SSEs in Nigeria, because of inability to meet the conditions of formal
lending institutions, have resorted to alternative sources of financing in the informal
financial institutions. According to a study by Ojo (1984), the sources of investment
finance for small industries are as summarized in Table 1. The Table shows that almost
all the funds came from personal savings (96.4 per cent) with about 3 per cent from
the informal sector and 0.21 per cent from the formal financial institutions. The trend
is further established by a 1983/84 study by the Nigerian Institute for Social and
Economic Research (NISER) (Table 2). Table 2 shows that about 73 per cent of the
respondents obtained their funds from personal savings, while only about 2 per cent
obtained their funds from the formal financial institutions.

The Role of Government in Financing and Promoting SSEs
There is a wide consensus in Nigeria that government business policies have been
made largely in favour of the large-scale enterprises to the detriment of small-scale
enterprises. For instance, while the large-scale enterprises have routinely enjoyed
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Table 1
SOURCES OF INVESTMENT FINANCE FOR SMALL
INDUSTRIES IN NIGERIA
·i
Source of finance

Owner's savings
Assisted by:
Banks
Government institutions
Local authorities
Co-operative societies
Relatives and friends
Money lenders
Total

Kwara
State

Lagos
State

Total
responses

Former
Western
State

Bendel
State
(respondents)

13,273

2,709

1,023

4,156

21,161

96.40

22

10

1
5

14
3

0.21
0.04
0.03
0.06
2.92
0.33
100.0

3

1
61
7

47
9
7
13
640
72

1,032

4,242

21,949

-

1

4
254
38

7
8
322
27

13,592

3,083

-

-

-

-

Percentage

Source: Ojo, Ade T. (1976, 1984), The Nigerian Financial System, Ibadan.

Table 2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY
GROUP BY SOURCES OF CAPITAL
Sources of capital
Industry
categories

Private Private
Nigerian nonNigerian

State
Govt.

Personal Co-op Commer
savings societies cial &
devel.
banks

Local
authorities

Total

Non-durable
consumer goods
Durable
consumer goods

7.76

0.40

0.78

41.64

0.85

0.89

0.08

52.40

6.17

0.04

1.90

14.01

0.23

0.70

0.08

23.13

Capital goods

6.28

0.15

0.23

17.27

0.31

0.23

-

24.47

20.21

0.59

2.91

72.92

1.39

1.82

0.16

100.00

Source: NISER Survey, 1983 / 84.
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such direct benefits as access to credit, foreign exchange, protection from severe
competition through tariffs and quotas, and trade licensing, the SSEs were often
ignored or at best paid lip services by the authorities. Enterprises and individuals
within this sector operate largely outside the system of government benefits and
regulation and thus have limited access to the formal credit institutions and the main
sources of technology transfer. Many of the economic agents within this sector
operate such activities as food processing, marketing of foodstuffs and consumer
goods, repair and maintenance of machinery and consumer durable, hotel, clearing
, and forwarding, motor and motor parts dealership and provision of transport
services.
In recent years, however, both the Federal and State Governments have introduced
various policies and programmes to redress the above shortcomings. First,
government established a co-ordinating umbrella organization called "Small-scale
Industries Corporation" in 1971, with responsibilities for promoting small-scale
industries generally through the provision of extension services and technical/
managerial assistance as well as meeting the training needs of the SSEs. In addition,
government has established a number of institutions and programmes to provide
development capital to the SSEs. To this end, a mix of financial institutions and
schemes/programmes has evolved over the years. Notable among these credit
institutions and programmes are the following:
1. Small-Scale Industries Credit Scheme (SSICS)
The Small-scale Industries Credit Scheme (SSICS) was introduced in 1971 as a
revolving grant by the Federal and State Governments to assist in meeting the credit
needs of small-scale enterprises, on relatively more liberal conditions than in private
lending institutions such as commercial banks. The problem of inadequate financial
resources, especially at the State level, coupled with reports of rampant mismanagement of the meagre funds by both the administrators of the loans as well as the
benefiting SSEs paralysed the scheme. Consequently, the Federal Government pulled
out of the scheme in 1979 to establish the Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry
(NBCI) as the apex credit institution for small-scale enterprises. The rationale for
establishing NBCI was to bring some prudence and financial discipline to bear on the
SSFs as well as the SSICS and hopefully ensure a more efficient utilization of scarce
financial resources for the development of viable small-scale enterprises. The state
governments were left to continue to administer, on individual basis, a small-scale
industry loan scheme under the aegis of their Ministries of Commerce and Industry
or through autonomous Development Finance Corporation/Investment Trust. Unfor~nately, most of the State credit institutions were not very effective partly because
?f inadequate funding and partly because of poor administration and political
interference.

. ,.,,,.,w,u,

rwn rnttrdif r

IN ANG & UI<PONG

,.
259

2. Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry (NBCI)
The NBCI was established jointly by the Federal Government and the Central Bank
of Nigeria in 1978, as an apex institution for financing small-scale enterprises. In
addition to its regular lending operations, NBCI was also to administer the Federal
Ministry of Industry's Special Fund for Small-Scale Enterprises under a soft loan
agreement. Other sources of funds available to NBCI, apart from the equity capital,
were grants from the Federal Government and short-falls arising from commercial
and merchant banks' inability to meet the recommended lending levels to small-scale
enterprises under the Central Bank's credit guidelines.
3. Central Bank of Nigeria Special Credit Programme for SSES
As the principal agent for implementing government financial and monetary
policies, the Central Bank of Nigeria has, over the years, introduced a number of
schemes for promoting improved access to credit for industrial development, par•
ticularly the small-scale industries. The main thrust of the Bank's programmes for
assisting SSEs can be grouped under two broad categories as follows:
(a) Credit Guidelines in Respect of Loans to Small-Scale Industries

With effect from 1970, the Central Bank of Nigeria expanded its credit guidelines to
incorporate the SSEs through the directive effective January 1971 to the banks to
ensure that at least 10 per cent of their total loans and advances are allocated to
small-scale enterprises. This percentage was increased to 16, from April 1980 and to
20since January 1990. Non-compliance attracts stiff penalties, including the forfeiture
of the short-falls of such loans by individuals banks under this directive, for on-lending to the target group through the NBCI.
(b) Central Bank Rural Banking Programme

The rural banking programme started in Nigeria in 1977 when the first phase
(1977-1980) was introduced. The programme seeks to moderate the problem of poor
access to credit by the rural sector operators, including most of the SSEs. During the
initial phase of the scheme, a total of 200 rural branches were to be established by the
then existing 21 commercial banks in the country. By the end of June 1980, a total of
188 such branches had been established. The second phase of the programme took
off from January 1981 to December 1984, during which 266 rural branches were
allocated to the existing commercial banks. By the end of 1984, a total of 229 such
branches had been opened. In response to continued pressure by the Central Bank
on the banks concerned, 19 and 9 additional branches were opened in 1985 and 1986,
respectively, bringing the number opened under the Second Phase to 257. The third
phase of the programme was launched on 1st August, 1985 and was expected to end
on 31st July, 1989 during which 300 branches were to be opened by all existing 28
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oommercial banks in proportion to their size. As at 31st December, 1989 a total of 293
rural branches had been opened under the third phase, bringing the cumulative
number to 756 rural bank branches. The Scheme was discontinued thereafter in
· preference for Community /Unit banks following wide-spread criticism that the rural
branches of urban commercial banks were an inappropriate strategy for providing
banking facilities in the rural areas.
4. The National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND)

With the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme [SAP] in 1986 and
the resultant sharp depreciation of the naira, coupled with equally sharp rise in
interest rates, many small-scale enterprises were finding it even more difficult to
obtain loans to finance investments and provide for working capital. In order to
bridge the ever widening resource gaps among this class of enterprises, the Federal
Government set up the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUND) effective 9th January, 1990, to provide relatively long-term loans (5-10 years) to small and
medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) at relatively concessionary rates of interest. It is
also expected that under NERFUND, the SMEs would have , 1sier access to foreign
exchange which this group of enterprises found difficult to acquire under the deregulated foreign exchange market (FEM).
Potentially, the resources of NERFUND included a matc.hing grant by the Federal
Government (WlOO million) and counterpart funding by the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, etc., projected at $280 million. The government of•
Czechoslovakia also agreed to contribute $50,000.00. The interest rate on
NERFUND's naira loan is expected to be slightly lower than the prevailing
commercial rates in the country and shall be fixed during the duration of the loan.
This is supposed to ease the access of small enterprises to credit, since NERFUND is
not established for profit motive. Thus, NERFUND is expected to charge the
Participating Banks (PBs) an interest rate not exceeding 1 percent above NERFUND' s
cost of borrowing the particular fund. The PBs, in turn, are supposed to charge the
SMEs not more than 4 per cent above the NERFUND rates. In practice, as at end of
June 1992, beneficiaries obtained NERFUND naira loans at 23.5 per cent, while
foreign currency loans carried variable interest rates, depending on the source of the
foreign loan and the terms of agreement concluded with NERFUND. Payment of
interest and principal due on the foreign currency loans is expected to be in naira
equivalent at the prevailing official FEM [selling] exchange rate; with the SMEs
bearing the foreign exchange risks, while the PBs bear the credit risks.
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5. World Bank Facility for the Small and Medium-Scale Enterprise (SMEX)
Loan
In order to further promote the growth of the SMEs, the Federal Government also
negotiated additional financial assistance with the World Bank to complement other
sources of funding for the SMEs. This involves a loan of US $270 million of which US
$265.7 million is to be made available for on-lending to SMEs through eligible
participating banks (PBs). The SMEX loan is managed directly by the SME Appex
Unit Loan Scheme located in the CBN. As at end of June 1992, about $26.9 million of
the facility had been disbursed to about 67 SMEs engaged in manufacturing, printing,
and mining activities. Other areas favoured by the loans were agro-allied, agriculture,
quarrying, and transport services. So far 120 enterprises had applied for $46.336
million through 17 (PBs) with NIDB handling 44 of the applications.
6. Nigerian Export and Import Bank (NEXIM)
NEXIM was established in January 1990 to manage a number of credit facilities
introduced specifically to boost Nigeria's non-oil export sector. The essence of
NEXIM was based on government's conviction that the economic prosperity of the
country was not to be allowed to hang permanently on the oil sector but also on a
healthy growth in the non-oil export sector. The establishment of NEXIM was also
intended to support farmers and other small-scale exporters to have direct access to
international markets. The facilities offered by NEXIM include the Export Stimulation Loan (ESL), the Foreign Input Facility (FIF) and the Refinancing and Rediscounting Facility (RRF).
The Export Stimulation Loan scheme of the Federal Government, which NEXIM
manages, is funded through a US $2,709 million loan from the African Development
Bank (ADB). The ESL seeks to bring out the best in Nigerian entrepreneurs who do
not have the facilities for producing their products for the international market but
have initiatives. It also seeks to diversify non-oil export products. The ESL funds are
devoted mainly to the acquisition of capital equipment required for export
production rather than foreign raw materials and spare parts. As a result of the
obvious success in the disbursement of the first ESL fund, the ADB has agreed in
principle to grant a second credit line of $150 million to NEXIM to further the Scheme.
The discount window refinancing and rediscounting (RRF) was first introduced
by the Central Bank of Nigeria in April 1987 to enhance banks' export financing
operations. The amount granted under the facility increased from W552.4 million in
1988 to W713.5 million in 1989 and Wl,371.0 million in 1990, when the RRF function
was transferred to NEXIM. The facility is to enable exporters to receive financing
while waiting to collect export proceeds. Thus, RRF assists exporters to extend credit
to overseas buyers and through this boost the scale of export operations. During 1991,
NEXIM disbursed about W769.2 million under the RRF to stimulate non-oil export
items in the country. The RRF attracts an interest rate of 1 per cent above CBN's
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Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR). Before an exporter can benefit from the RRF
, scheme to the tune of Hl million and above, he must have an outstanding record in
export business and must have been issued a Certificate of Performance.
Third among the NEXIM facilities is the Foreign Input Facility (FIF) which is
.designed to give manufacturers for exports access to foreign exchange required to
import machinery (for their factory) and vital raw materials which cannot be
procured in Nigeria. The FIF loans are granted on moratoria of 2 years for capital
equipment and 18 months for raw materials. It also attracts interest rates of
· 9,.50-10.50 per cent.
/ In the bid to further increase earnings from non-oil export sector, NEXIM recently
jptroduced a package of new products specifically designed as incentives to
.exporters. They include Price Guarantee Facility (PGF); Export Credit Guarantee
·~acility (ECGF); Manufacturing-In-Bond Guarantee Facility (MBGF) and Mutual
Export Guarantee Facility (MEGF). PGF is to enable exporters to enter into any export
~Iltract (spot or future) without fear of price fluctuations. ECGF covers defaults
·_rising from inability to receive payment for loans to exporters due among others to
elay in transfer of payments by the monetary authorities of the buyers' country.
, . GF, which is meant to replace the Duty Draw Back Scheme, is a guarantee to be
'~ven to Customs authorities in lieu of cash deposit in respect of import duty on
... ported input of export manufacture, while MEGF is a commitment which NEXIM
,., es to banks in respect of credit given by them to small and infant explorers who
ng to a Mutual Export Guarantee Association recognized by NEXIM.

.. e People's Bank of Nigeria
~ People's Bank of Nigeria (PBN) was formally commissioned in October 1989
'en its first branch was opened at Ajegunle in Lagos. The PBN is specifically
·~ned to meet the credit needs of the ultra small-scale enterprises such as artisans,
· izers and petty traders. As at the end of June 1992, a total of 169 branches had
.. established throughout the country; while loans outstanding as at end of 1990
'unted to W:74.0 million for 79,061 borrowers.

unity Banks
' '1i'

_programme for the establishment of Community banks was announced in the
,.,Federal Government Budget This category of banks is expected to carry out
, "ng businesses but at purely local community level. Their role is to provide
/e financial services for the rural area as well as micro-enterprises in the urban
• Unlike the People's Bank, the Community Banks are to be privately owned,
'that the Federal Government has undertaken to provide loan funds and
' al support services to needy community banks. Towards the end of that year,
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Government established the Community Bank Implementation Committee (CBIC)
with responsibility, among others, for appraising application and issuing provisional
licenses to incorporated community banks. Formal licenses were ultimately issued
by the Federal Ministry of Finance, upon application presented to it by the CBIC
through the Central Bank of Nigeria. By the end of 1990, 705 applications had been
received by the CBIC, 353 of which were given provisional approval. The CBIC had
since metamorphosed into the National Board on Community Banks, with the sole
authority to issue provisional licenses for the operation of community banks for two
years after which the CBN would, subject to satisfactory performance, issue formal
licenses. The number of Community Banks increased to 401 at the end of December,
1992, showing a faster pace of granting of approvals compared with the initial
situation in 1990.

PART III
AN EVALUATION OF EXISTING SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISES
CREDIT SCHEMES IN NIGERIA
An objective assessment of the effectiveness of the various SSE Credit Institutions/Schemes reviewed above should be able to indicate the extent to which the
institutions and schemes have been able to meet the credit needs of the SSEs. A further
discussion would have been to find out how efficiently such services were performed.
The assessment of the adequacy of the institutions/schemes requires a wide range
of indicators of effectiveness such as the capital absorptive capacity of the SSEs, defined
as the overall financing which the SSEs can productively utilize to achieve the
optimum growth potential during a given period of time; and the financing gap,
defined as the difference between the level of funding received and what is actually
needed for the purpose of satisfying investment and working capital needs of SSEs
to achieve their desired growth rate. Unfortunately, statistics needed for computing
the above indicators, especially in the context of the Nigerian SSEs, are not readily
available. Consequently, the framework of our evaluation will be based largely on
such fragmentary data as the gap between total loans approved and disbursed over
the years to the SSEs by the various credit institutions and credit schemes reviewed
in the preceding section of the paper.

(a) Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry
Available data showed that between 1980 and 1990, total loans approved by NBCI
for SSEs amounted to W710.5 million while actual disbursements totalled only W281.6
million, representing about 39.6 per cent of approvals. The picture was generally
worse during the three pre-SAP years (1984-86) (see Table 3). Available data also
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showed that the number of projects approved by NBCI has been on a sharp decline
from 173 in 1987 to 36 in 1990 (see 1:able 4). The inability of many small-scale
enterprises to meet the minimum lending requirements of NBCI, coupled with the
limited financial resources of the bank itself were considered as being largely responsible for the observed wide gaps between loan approvals and actual disbursements.

Table 3
NBCI TOTAL APPROVALS AND DISBURSEMENT (1981-1990) 1
(W' million)
Year

Approvals

Disbursements

(1)

(2)

Gap
Actual

%

1981

55.47

12.67

42.80

77.2

1982

29.88

27.16

2.72

9.1

1983

22.36

31.90

-9.54

1984

0.20

0.24

-6.0

1985

2.87

9.64

-6.77

1986

16.88

17.14

-0.26

-

1987

117.75

21.15

96.60

82.0

1988

142.96

15.922

127.04

88.9

1989

89.72

52.10

137.62

72.5

1990

132.40

87.70

44.70

33.8

TOTAL

710.49

281.62

428.87

60.4

Source: Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry.
1.

Includes long and short-term loans of N:6.7 million, EDP /WFYP loans of J«l.86 million and
the World Bank loan component of ~.3 million.

2.

The figures above cover approvals and disbursement to all projects except those to FME
Small-Scale Enterprises.
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general inability on the part of SSEs to provide collateral securities to back-up
loan requirements.

Tables
PROFILE OF ALL LICENSED BANKS LENDING TO SSEs: 1980-1991
ACHIEVEMENTS

TARGETS
C0MMEROAL
BANKS
Stipulated%

16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
20
20

Achieved
%

MEROIANT
BANKS

C0MMEROAL
BANKS

Stipulated%

Achieved
Total
Lending
%
(H'm)

16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
20
20

6,349.1
8,582.9
10,275.3
11,093.9
11,583.6
12,170.2
15,701.6
17,531.9
19,561.2
22,008.0
26,665.5
29,308.4

1.6
2.4
2.0
3.1
6.3
3.8
9.0
23.3
21.3
21.5
20.3
22.4

3.1
3.4
3.7
13.3
22.2
21.2
25.9
28.4

MEROIANT
BANKS

Actual
Total
Lending Lending
to SSE
(H'm)
(H'm)
102.1
203.2
206.7
351.3
729.1
462.5
1,413.1
4,084.9
4,166.5
4,731.7
5,413.1
6,565.1

n.a.
72.0
1,026.8
1,185.5
1,685.8
1,802.9
Z,771.5
4,165.8
4,289.8
5,668.2
8.080.1
9,895.9

Actual
Lending
to SSE
(H'm)

0.052
0.061
0.101
0.553
0.983
1,251.0
2,090.0
Z,808.5

Central Bank of Nigeria.

: regard to the rural branch banking programme, available data show that the
~ e has been generally beneficial, in terms of its effects on the overall size of
\ by the commercial banks to SSEs, especially rural based manufacturing
:· es. Nevertheless, most of the rural branches exhibited little or no initiative
,ng with the rural sector, as they are merely outfit of urban-based commercial
••·· inostly being compelled by government fiat to the rural areas. Thus, most of
.,fill branches, being mere deposit collecting centres for the urban-based
" ; ial banks, made no serious efforts to develop banking habit in the rural areas .
.Yer, the paucity of basic infrastructure such as good access roads, pipe-borne
., electricity and telephones in rural areas considerably constrained banking
- ·ons there.
,;,

Table 6
SECTORAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF COMMERCIAL BANKS' LOANS AND ADVANCES 1980-1991
(H' million)
1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1939

1990

1991

1.

Aggregate Loans and
Advances

6,349.1

8,5829

10,275.3

11,093.9

11,503.6

12,170.2

15,701.6

17,531.9

19,561.2

22,008.0

25,999.1

31,323.9

2

Aggregate Loans and
Advances to Small-Scale
Enterprises

113.40

185.00

206.70

351.30

705.70

972.20

1,454.30

3,587.30

5,090.60

5,789.80

7,954.60

8,096.7

Percentage Allocation
and Small-Scale
Enterprises (%)

1.78

2.15

201

3.16

6.13

7.99

9.26

20.69

26.02

26.30

30.59

25.85

Category A:
Up to N25,000

0.20

0.20

0.30

0.30

1.03

1.00

1.60

1.90

4.20

4.80

260

287

H25,000 -NS0,000

0.30

0.20

0.30

0.76

0.80

0.80

0.60

200

3.90

2.60

2.40

284

CategoryC:
NS0,000 -Nl00,000

0.30

0.30

0.20

0.30

0.90

3.10

1.00

233

2.33

2.90

4.80

5.28

Nl00,000-N200,000

0.30

0.30

0.21

0.40

1.20

1.00

0.70

270

3.50

3.50

5.20

6.13

CategoryE:
N2DO,OOO-N500,000

0.70

1.15

1.00

1.40

2.20

2.00

1.40

3.80

4.30

4.00

7.69

8.73

Other Category (F k G)

-

-

-

-

NIA

NIA

NIA

0.02

NIA

NIA

-

-

0.10

Unspecified Cat~ory

-

3.96

7.96

7.79

8.48

7.90

3.

Category 8:

Category 0:
f>

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Lagos .

•

-
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(c) National Economic Reconstruction Fund
A total of 156 projects received loan approvals estimated at N:1.4 billion under the
NERFUND as at the end of June, 1992. Of this number, 77 were for agro-allied, 59 for
manufacturing, 8 for textile milling, 4 for mining/ quarrying and 8 for industrial
support services. Effective commitment by NERFUND in terms of the number of
projects which actually received disbursement during the same period was, however,
only 92, representing about 59 per cent of the number of projects which received
approval. Agro-allied accounted for 52 of this number, while manufacturing, textile
milling, mining/ quarrying and industrial support services accounted for 25, 8, 3 and
4, respectively, bringing the total number of projects for which disbursement was
made as at June 1992, to 92. The amount disbursed was aboutN:390.4million or about
28 per cent of the value of loans approved. This was made up of US $27.0 million and
N:120.4 million (see Table 7).
Table 7
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION FUND SECTORAL
DISTRIBUTION OF SANCTIONED AND DISBURSED PROJECTS
AS AT JULY 1992

Section

Agro-Allied
Manufacturing
Textile
Mining/ Quarrying
Industrial Support Services
TOTAL

No.of
Sanctions

No.of
Projects
Disbursed

% of
Sanctions to
Total

%of
Disbursed
56.52
27.17
8.70
3.26
4.36
100.00

77
59
8
4
8

52
25
3
4

49.36
37.82
5.13
2.56
5.13

156

92

100.00

8

Notes:
(a) Number of participating banks
= 98
(b) Number of banks with projects approved
= 42
(c) Number of projects approved
= 156
(d) Total e~timated project cost (approved projects) = Hl.4 billion
(e) C_omm1tment by NERFUND to approved projects
(1) US $51.5 million
(ii) N:258.9 million
(f) Number of project disbursed
= 92
(g) Amount disbursed as at June 1992
(i) US $27.0 million
(ii) N:120.4 million
Source: NERFUND.
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The relatively unsatisfactory performance indicated above was due largely to the
restrictive eligibility conditions for enterprises wishing to benefit from the
NERFUND. One of the most constraining provisions relates to the requirement that
the PBs are to bear all the credit risk involved in financing the SMEs under
NERFUND. The reluctance of the PBs to bear such risks was manifested in the rather
cautious attitude of the banks in dealing with the SMEs. Secondly, there is the-problem
of the inability on the part of the SSEs to finance the required minimum personal
stake of one-third of the projected cost of a project; a problem which is compounded
by SMEs' usual aversion to ownership dilusion. A third constraint is the level of
interest rate on NERFUND loans, which is even more debilitating for the SMEs than
for the large-scale companies.

(d) World Bank SME Loan Facility
As at June 1992, a total of US $60 million or 22.2 per cent of the $270 million provided
under the SME Facility had been committed to various projects. Like NERFUND,
only $30 million (or 11.1 per cent) of the total had been disbursed. Also, like the
NERFUND, the SME Facility is also known to be beset with such problems as the
reluctance of the PBs to bear the credit risk and the inability of the SSEs to provide
the mandatory personal stake of one-third of the projected cost.

(e) NEXIM
The total loan disbursed by NEXIM under the export refinancing and rediscounting
facility as at end December 1991 amounted to about W769.2 million. The Export
Stimulation Loan, funded through the US $270 million ADB Facility, had by end of
1991 been fully disbursed and arrangements were on hand to obtain a replenishment.
Under the FIF, NEXIM had also disbursed W118.6 million during the same period.
Despite this impressive performance, NEXIM loan conditions are also considered
relatively stringent and capable of stalling NEXIM's dream of promoting the growth
and diversification of Nigeria's non-oil exports, especially at the SSEs' level. For
instance, the period of mora tori a allowed for the beneficiaries of the ESL is considered
relatively short, given the long delays attending the processing of export/import
transactions in Nigeria. There is also the binding constraint which is that the
participating banks are considered to be jointly liable with the customers and may
be called upon to repay if their customers default. Furthermore, another critical
condition for repayment is that the loan will not only be repaid in foreign exchange
but from the foreign exchange proceeds of the export of goods produced from the
project financed from ESL facility.

.
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(f) People's Bank of Nigeria
As indicated earlier, 169 branches of th~ People's Bank were established in various
locations throughout the country as at June 1992, barely three years from the inception of the new Bank. The number of loan beneficiaries was put at 181,061 as at end
June 1992, while total loan outstanding was N102.6 million.
Among the reasons given for the relatively impressive performance by the bank,
at least during its early history, is the strategy of using the so-called "peer group" as
a basis for granting loans to groups of individuals. People within such groups are
supposed to relate closely to each other and are expected to have jointly vouched to
guarantee the repayment of the loan extended to the entire group. Such an arrangement serves as a viable option to the conventional collateral security requirement
which most applicants for PBN loans on their own could hardly afford. Like the
People's Bank, some conventional banks have started adopting the approach of
lending to small, formal and informal self-help groups [SHGs] as additional advantages of this mode of lending include minimization of transaction cost to parties
involved, boosting the number of beneficiaries and increasing the rate of loan
repayment. Reports from selected banks during the CBN conference of agricultural
credit officers in 1992 showed that lending to SHGs, coupled with guarantee and
insurance, raised loan repayment rate from between 40-50 per cent to over 60 per
cent. On the other hand, the major problems of the People's Bank, apart from the
initial logistic difficulties, include inadequate financial resources to meet the bank's
vast lending requirements. Unfortunately, because of the concessionary nature of its
lending, its funds can only come through grants from the Federal Government, as its
access to the capital market and ability to mobilize savings are constrained by its
relatively low lending rates.

(g) Community Banks
The number of community banks in operation has risen from one in 1991 to 186 by
the end of June 1992. The banks have varied significantly in terms of the size of capital,
volume of business and the quality of facilities. While a few of them have just met
the required minimum paid-up capital of N250,00, many of them have capital size of
between N300,000 and N600,000. A few others, however, have paid-up capital well
above this level. At the end of December, 1991, the banks had total deposits of W:76.7
million. Saving deposits and time deposits amounted to H31.3 million and H34.4
million, respectively, while demand deposits stood at N:11 .0 million. The banks' other
main sources of funds were capital funds and other liabilities which amounted to
N34.0 million and NS.5 million, respectively. In addition, a few of the banks obtained
funds from miscellaneous/other creditors while one of the banks even utilized call
money from banks in Nigeria. The banks' loans and advances totalled W:16.0 million
as at end of 1991. Deposits and lending rates in the banks during 1991 mirrored the
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prevailing rates in the commercial banks. The rate on savings deposits ranged from
10-17 per cent but clustered around 13.5 per cent; while time deposit rates clustered
around 16.0 per cent, with a range of 12-18 per cent. The lending rates ranged from
18-28 per cent and clustered around 21 per cent between 1991 and early 1992.
As would be expected, the bulk of the Community Banks' clients (borrowers) were
in the category of small enterprises. Unfortunately, the banks are not yet widespread
enough to make the desired impact on SMEs' access to credit. The initial slow pace
of processing application for the licensing of Community Banks has contributed to a
large back-log of applications with the NBCB awaiting even the provisional approval.

PART IV
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVED ACCESS TO CREDIT FOR SSEs
There is no doubt that the various credit schemes reviewed above have assisted to
some degree in meeting the credit needs of small-scale enterprises. However, the
perennial problem of high risk associated with this class of enterprises has continued
to pose serious impediments to the achievement of better access to credit by small
enterprises in Nigeria. A review of the experiences of some developing countries with
a similar problem shows that such countries have tried to develop programmes
designed specifically to get around the risk element. The most common among such
programmes is the Risk Capital Scheme, the objective of which is to provide financial
assistance on liberal terms especially to new entrepreneurs which do not have
adequate financial resources of their own for setting up or expanding their businesses. The usual requirement is that prospective entrepreneurs should show
evidence that they are technically qualified or possess relevant experience and skill
to pursue chosen lines of business. This was the logic behind the establishment of the
SSICS, the NBCI and indeed the People's Bank. The main handicap here is the fact
that the source of such loanable funds is usually the government whose resources are
limited.
Another risk accommodating scheme is the rediscounting and refinancing scheme.
Under the rediscounting scheme, owners of vital goods such as machines and
equipment can supply them on deferred-payment basis to prospective purchasers.
The vendor, (usually the manufacturer of such goods) would then obtain immediate
payment by discounting the bills of exchange or promissory notes arising out of the
sales transaction with his banker. In this way, the scheme helps both the
manufacturers to increase their turn-over and the small-scale entrepreneur to
expand/modernize his business, which wc,uld otherwise have been constrained by
lack of finance.
Funds fr•r refinancing, on the other hand, are usually provided by the apex finance
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institution to credit institutions which must repay on due date irrespective of the
"position of their recovery from the borrowing units. The refinanced loans could be
. :for development, expansion, modernization or rehabilitation. The interest rates and
other lending conditions are usually in conformity with those stipulated by the apex
institution, and there is no minimum limit to the amount ofloan eligible for refinance.
These types of credit enhancement schemes are currently being handled by NEXIM.

_The Underlying Principle of a Credit Guarantee/Insurance Scheme
.):'he traditional practice among most credit institutions, before granting credit
<iacilities to customers, is to request for tangible collateral securities. The aim is to
"protect the funds of both the shareholders of such credit institutions as well as
depositors who save with such institutions. When strict requirements of collateral
·:,_ecurities are maintained, there could be a conflict between lending institution's
ecurity requirements and government policy of seeking to support target borrowers
)o cannot offer such collateral securities. One way to resolve such conflict is for a
, ird party to provide an intangible security commonly referred to as "guarantees".
:.:pus, by helping to convert ineligible collaterals of the under-privileged borrowers
· to eligible collaterals, credit guarantee often serves as a major avenue for rendering
. direct financial assistance to the borrower and are usually referred to as collective
.ternal collaterals.

:rypes of Collective External Collaterals
There are two types of collective external collateral, namely, the institutional-lender
''5ecurity and the institutional-lender-borrower security. The first type merely seeks
·~ to reduce the risk to the lender and thereby increase his willingness to extend credit
\;·to the target borrower. All types of credit guarantee schemes fall within this category,
>·and they are usually seen as a form of subsidy to the target borrowers tohelpimprove
'.'. :-their credit rating.
...
The second category of guarantee does not only reduce the risk to the lender but
\ Jo the borrower also. It is intended to shield both the lender and the borrower from
7specified risks and thereby increase the availability of credit from lender to borrower.
;; rExamples of institutional-lender-borrower security include government price/
purchase guarantees (e.g. the guarantee minimum prices which operated during the
regime of Commodity Boards) and risk to income insurance policies, usually undertaken by borrowers against unforeseen occurrences such as drought, diseases, fire
and theft. Disbursement to cover non-repayment of loans or other contingencies
would be made from the fund accumulated for the purpose. Government may also
subsidize some or all of these costs or make an initial subscription to a guarantee fund
if it wishes to support the purposes of a guarantee. If a group of borrowers assumes
full liability for each member's repayment, any payments to make good a default on
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loan repayment would be made entirely from within the group. This is more of a
self-help contributory fund organized for the purpose of providing collaterals to
members. Typical illustration of this is in respect of the "Peer Group" of borrowers
currently being practiced by the People's Bank of Nigeria.

Experience of.Some Selected Countries with Credit
Guarantee/Insurance Scheme
The experiences of four developing countries, India, Mexico, the Philippines, and
Nigeria, with credit guarantee /insurance schemes as vehicle for boosting the flow of
credit to target borrowers are highlighted below:
(a) India
As part of a strategy for facilitating the flow of financial assistance to small-scale
farmers and enterprises, India established an Agricultural Development Bank and
an Industrial Development Ban~ in the early 1950s and 1960s, as apex organizations
to refinance credit supplied by other financial institutions for both agricultural and
industrial projects. Their responsibilities also include the provision of guarantees and
cash incentives (known as matching fund) to small-scale farmers and entrepreneurs.
Loan guarantees administered by these agencies would reimburse banks to the tune
of 50 per cent of defaults on loans issued for specified agricultural and industrial
enterprises. In some cases, the guarantee takes the form of crop insurance whereby
the insurers agree to pay the lender a certain percentage of the loan made to the
entrepreneur after allowable crop or output damaged has been verified.
Available data show that in India substantial credits have been granted by
(nationalized) commercial banks under the refinancing and guarantee scheme to
agricultural and small-scale industries. The guarantees improved access of small
businesses to credit, thereby ensuring widespread adoption of improved technologies such as small-scale irrigation schemes and high yielding varieties of seeds
among peasant farmers.
A major problem of the Indian credit system, however, is the overwhelming
presence of government subsidy programmes. The high probability of debt forgiveness for political considerations has heightened the risks of loan delinquency and
frequent resort to redemption of the guaranteed loans. In all the three aspects of
agricultural credit, the recovery of agricultural loans has becomes a matter of concern,
a~ the levels of recovery have been between 50 and 60 per cent of the demand in the
last few years. Perhaps, in the preoccupation with disbursement, sufficient attention
had not been paid by the credit institutions to supervision use, follow-up and
recovery of loans as they fell due. Certain external factors, including natural
calamities, have also affected the capacity or the willingness of the borrowers to repay
the loans. Poor recycling of credit also affected the ability of the institutions to
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continue or expand their operations on a viable basis. Arising from the poor
repayment performance, the incidence of claims on the guaranteeing agency, against
the small loans guaranteed by it, has substantially increased and reached a level
where the guarantee scheme's viability itself has been threatened. The agency has
had to double the guarantee charges from 1 April, 1989 (from 0.75 per cent to 1.5 per
cent of the amount guaranteed). The experience with the crop insurance scheme,
started in 1985, has not been different either. The rates of insurance premium have
been fixed at relatively low levels (2 per cent of the amount insured for food crops
and 1 per cent for oil-seeds and pulses) and the amounts of insurance claims received
since inception have far exceeded the premium collected, and the scheme is being
subsidized by the Government.
(b) Mexico

Faced with a situation where banks were unwilling to channel enough credit to
agriculture and small-scale enterprises, the government of Mexico in 1959 created a
Trust Fund in the Bank of Mexico to rediscount and guarantee small industrial and
agricultural loans extended by private banks. After years of review and reforms of
the credit system, the government decided to re-organize the whole rural credit
system by creating a central agricultural bank known as Banco National de Credit
Rural (BANCURAL) whose operations include refinancing of rural agricultural and
industrial projects, managing the Trust Fund to guarantee credit, and providing
rediscounting facility to private banks which lend to target borrowers.
The net effect of both the rediscounting and guarantee schemes on the flow of
credit to small industries and agriculture was very positive. Between 1975 and 1980,
guaranteed credit rose from about 5 per cent to 33 per cent of total banking system
credit and has since stabilized at this level. The structure of credit was also
substantially in favour of the less privileged borrowers such as small farmers and
small-scale entrepreneurs who lacked collateral securities.
(c) The Philippines
In the mid-l 960s, the Central Bank of Philippines established an Agricultural Guarantee Loan Fund (AGLF) which was placed as special deposits in various rural banks.
These deposits serve both as sources of loanable funds and as a channel for providing
partial guarantee for loans granted by the rural banks. The AGLF was subsequently
replaced by the Agricultural Guarantee Fund (ACF) under which the level of guarantee was raised to 70 per cent of all losses incurred by rural banks in respect of loans
granted to targeted producers. In order to streamline the administration of the
different guarantee funds, a single Trust Fund, administered by the Land Bank of
Phi~ippines, was introduced to guarantee up to 85 percentofloans for the production
of nee, sorghum and soya beans.
Since the introduction of ACF, there has been a marked increase in bank
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participation in the supervised credit programme from an initial 343 banks in 1973
to more than 500 banks in 1974. Also as at April 1976, a total of 77 billion peso in com
and feed grains production loans were granted coverage. There was also an increase
in guarantee in the succeeding phases of supervised credit programmes because of
the requirement that all supervised credit must be guaranteed as a pre-requisite for
preferential rediscounting.
(d) Nigeria

i

Following the promulgation of the enabling Act in 1977, the Central Bank of Nigeria
established an Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS) with a total funding
of HlOO million which was contributed by the Federal Government (60%) and the
CBN (40%). The ACGS provides 75 per cent guarantee to lending institutions for any
loan default under the scheme. Lending banks now have the responsibility of
exhausting legal means ofloan recovery before having redress through the guarantee
scheme. The ACGS operations were however not complemented by a refinancing or
rediscounting facilities.
In spite of this, there has been rapid growth in credit to agriculture as a result of
the scheme, although it was not immediately clear if this could be attributed to the
guarantee schemes only or to such complementary policies as the compulsory credit
quota allocations to agriculture and the Rural Banking Scheme, all of which have
been important motivating forces behind credit supply to the agricultural sector.
Available data show that, with the introduction of ACGS and the Rural Banking
Schemes, there has been a rapid growth in the banking system credit to agriculture,
from an annual average of W75 million in 1975-77 to about W350.00 million in 1978-80
(the initial years of the rural banking schemes). ACGS loans averaged W43.9 million
annually or approximately 11.6 per cent of total credit to agriculture. It has, however,
been estimated that only a small fraction of loan applications under ACGS has been
honoured by banks. This situation was compounded by the delay in the
disbursement of loans by banks which tended to frustrate farmers and encourage
default.
In order to complement the ACGS, the National Insurance Corporation of Nigeria
has, in conjunction with the Federal and State Governments, commenced the
National Agricultural Insurance Scheme to provide insurance for selected
agricultural activities against natural hazards such as drought, flood and diseases as
well as pest infestations. NICON is also currently working on a new insurance
scheme to cover banks that grant loans under the NERFUND scheme. The scheme,
tagged NICON-NERFUND Credit Insurance Scheme, was launched in June 1992. It
is to assist banks in reducing credit risks arising from loans granted in respect of
NERFUND projects. The scheme will ensure favourable lending conditions to
prospective clients and thereby assist in the development of SSEs. Other advantages
include protection against losses resulting from loans to industrial projects,
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protection against protracted default by debtors, assistance in collection of overdue
accounts and reduction of the need for banks to provide for bad debts. The scheme
will also provide advice on credit worthiness of loan seekers, enhance cash flow of
banks, give comprehensive protection to the insured and provide ultimate
risk-sharing instrument for rapid industrialization.

Policy Implications of the Above Experiences
The foregoing countries' experiences appear to confirm that policy measures aimed
at altering lender institutions' behaviour towards collateral security requirements
have been greatly assisted by the introduction of credit guarantees/insurance
schemes. Available evidence also shows that such credit guarantee/insurance
schemes do not, however, help to eliminate loan defaults completely. Experience also
shows that the credit insurance scheme is relatively more efficient than the official
credit guarantee because it is beneficial to both the lenders and borrowers, and the
subsidy element implied in determining the premium payable by the borrower can
be gradually phased out as the target borrower becomes relatively more competitive
and efficient. Further extension of credit guarantee and insurance schemes to most
SSEs would strengthen their productive capacity, foster their growth and increase
their contribution to the economy as a whole.

PART V
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings
The paper has reviewed the various credit schemes which government has introduced since the early 1970s in a bid to boost the flow of credit to small-scale
enterprises in the country. These include the Small-scale Industries Credit Scheme
(SSICS), introduced in 1971; the establishment of the NBCI in 1977; and the introduction of credit guidelines and rural banking by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 1977 and
l 979, respectively. Other more recent programmes include the NERFUND, the World
Bank-sponsored SMEX Loan Scheme, the ESL and RRF by NEXIM and the People's
Bank loans.
There is ample evidence, that in spite of all these schemes/programmes, smallscale enterprises still face the problem of restricted access to credit. Apart from the
dearth of financial resources among specialized government credit institutions such
as NBCI and state-owned finance corporations and investment trusts, the problem
of poor access of SSEs to institutional credit has been largely due to the high-risk
nature of these enterprises. The relationship between SSFs and banks has not been
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sufficiently mutually re-inforcing and the former appears to have lost confidence in
the latter. Other problems which have adversely affected the flow of credit include
shortage of skilled manpower among the SSEs, high mortality rate, low productivity
and the inability to compete effectively with other enterprises in both factor and
product markets. Indeed, even the technical details often required by lending
institutions, including those under such special schemes as NERFUND, are well
beyond the scope of most SSEs.
Against the background of these problems, which seem to have greatly reduced
the growth potentials of the SSEs, future prospect of these enterprises was examined.
There appears to be a broad consensus among analysts that for the existing credit
schemes and programmes to achieve the desired impacts, there is need to evolve a
more dynamic lending strategy which would ensure that existing credit policies and
programmes are more effectively implemented without inflicting losses on the
lending institutions. One option that has been frequently mooted is the credit
guarantee and insurance scheme which has been tried in the Nigerian agricultural
sector. The paper reviewed the basic principles underlying the credit guarantee and
insurance schemes and examined their performance in four developing countries,
namely, India, Mexico, Philippines and Nigeria where the schemes have achieved
varying degrees of success.

CONCLUSION
Over the years, government has recognized the vital role SSEs can play in ensuring
meaningful and sustainable growth. Towards this end, a number of policies and
programmes have been introduced to assist the growth of this class of enterprises.
One major area of assistance is that of improving the access of SSEs to credit through
the establishment of a number of special credit institutions and programmes to target
the SSEs. These programmes have had varying degrees of success. rhe need for some
form of credit guarantee for small-scale industries seems to have long been recognized. It was even proposed in 1976 by the Committee on the Nigerian Financial
System. Recently, the NERFUND Scheme has suggested a form of credit insurance
as a pre-requisite for the scheme. It has also been indicated that the guarantee and
insurance schemes have facilitated the flow of credit from private institutions to
target sectors/ enterprises in countries like India, Mexico and the Philippines which
have tried these schemes. In the light of the above, it is believed that credit guarantee
and insurance schemes currently being applied in the Nigerian agricultural sector
could profitably be extended to the small-scale enterprises (excluding trading concerns).
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